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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
OFF SECY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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JCSM-431-61

26 JUN 1961

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Berlin Contingency Planning (U)

1. Reference is made to a memorandum from the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs to the Secretary of Defense, dated 13 June 1961, subject as above, in which he requested answers to questions posed by Mr. Acheson in his continuing review of the Berlin problem.

2. The three studies were prepared on a priority basis. They are responsive to Mr. Acheson's questions on the above request which states, in part: "These questions do not reflect any policy decisions, but are posed to create an analytical framework which would be helpful in review of the Berlin problem." Consideration was given to the views developed jointly by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with Mr. Dean Acheson and General Norstad during the discussions held on 14 June 1961.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the immediate concern is to influence Soviet decisions on Berlin before they are taken this summer or fall. United States preparations for a Berlin crisis - in the US, in Europe, and worldwide - should be taken in both nuclear and nonnuclear military areas concurrently. In this connection the requirement for modernizing, strengthening, and improving the US and Allied military posture worldwide has been recognized; however, the basic consideration remains the need for re-establishing the credibility of the nuclear deterrent. Our Allies must have confidence and the USSR must be made to believe that the United States has the will and determination to use nuclear weapons in the defense of NATO, Berlin or the US position worldwide, as necessary, rather than submit to Soviet abrogation of US and Allied rights or position. Berlin is the immediate concern, and the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the questions posed by Mr. Dean Acheson are contained herein.

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4. The conclusions to the three appended studies, which are based on the assumption that nuclear weapons will not be employed by either side, are summarized as follows:

a. Military Measures Worldwide

(1) The early execution by the United States of the measures enumerated in Annex C to Appendix A, within the time limits assumed in this study (i.e., 31 October 1961), would be expected to influence the Soviet decision process regarding Berlin. The military actions can be taken only if the necessary political decisions required to implement them have been made. Implicit in such political decisions is the acceptance of the risk of general war.

(2) The measures enumerated in Annex C to Appendix A in most cases depend for full effectiveness upon complete Allied cooperation, particularly by the nations with the greatest interest in the Berlin question - the United Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). United States action alone is feasible only to the extent that the Allies will permit the use of their national territories and that the action contemplated does not involve the sovereignty of an Ally. The measures are designed to be a clear demonstration of US determination and leadership which could be expected not only to influence the Soviet decision-making process, but also to restore the confidence of our Allies in the United States and to obtain their full cooperation and support.

(3) Although a measure of Allied agreement could probably be obtained for the early execution of some of the measures envisaged in Annex C to Appendix A (e.g., increase state of readiness of US forces worldwide, but particularly in Europe), it is doubtful that US Allies, in the absence of a clear-cut Soviet-inspired Berlin incident, would agree to a rapid and systematic build-up for limited nonnuclear war in Central Europe together with the risk of general war.

(4) The execution of the measures envisaged in Annex C to Appendix A is designed to produce a strong deterrent effect on the Soviets. There is a possibility, however, that the Soviets might react by taking military counteractions to pre-empt US

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and/or Allied efforts to protect West Berlin. For this reason, the United States must be prepared for general war.

b. Types and Amount of Offensive Nonnuclear Force for Certain Contingencies

(1) When opposed by GDR forces alone. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirm their view that the hypothesis of opposition from GDR forces alone is invalid, and that there is no substantive difference between GDR and Soviet military forces. However, using present active GDR forces as a unit of measurement (6 divisions and about 225 tactical aircraft), it is considered that a balanced force of seven divisions supported by four tactical air wings could reopen access to Berlin. This size force is based on the assumption that political limitations restrict military operations to the axis of the Helmstedt-Berlin autobahn and the air forces to defensive operations only.

(2) When opposed by readily available USSR and GDR forces in the area of East Germany only. Under such a situation, the hostilities could not be limited to the Helmstedt-Berlin corridor alone. Operations would have to be conducted to meet and defeat Soviet and GDR forces throughout East Germany with the objective of establishing a defense line on the Oder-Neisse River line. Forces on the order of 50 allied divisions and a corresponding magnitude of air strength would be required to achieve this objective.

(3) To allow the Communists time and opportunity to change their decision to block access. If the action begins with Allied forces opposed by GDR forces only, a balanced seven divisional force with adequate air support would provide, during the first five days, time and opportunity for the Communists to change their decision to block access. In the event that the Soviets entered the operation at any time, the situation described in paragraph 4b(2) would pertain. The Allied force of seven divisions already committed to the operation could avoid destruction.

c. Adequacy of Capabilities

(1) After a mobilization period of four months, the United States, or the US and its European Allies, has the capability

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of deploying sufficient ground and air forces to Europe to restore access to Berlin if opposed only by GDR. This same size force could avoid destruction for a period of five days or 15 days if opposed by GDR and Russian forces.

(2) Due to the inability to determine the quality of European Allied forces and due to the inability to predict with confidence that all European Allies and the United States will commence full mobilization four months prior to an anticipated incident in Berlin, it is considered that there would not be sufficient forces in Europe by 31 October 1961 to restore access to Berlin against successively higher levels of GDR and Soviet resistance.

(3) Because of the need for air bases, staging areas and assembly areas, it is impractical for the United States to consider unilateral action in the Berlin area. As a minimum, full cooperation of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) is required, and to a lesser degree that of France and Great Britain. In addition, the United States cannot put sufficient forces in Europe in a four-month period to restore access against successively higher levels of GDR and Soviet resistance.

(4) Considering the reinforcement rate of both sides and the need for industrial mobilization in order that the United States can support its Allies as well as its own forces, it would not be feasible for European Allies or the United States to engage in nonnuclear war for any extended period with the Soviet Bloc forces which could be brought into the area by 31 October 1961. In some cases, mobilization of the Allied countries requires 15 months and only after full mobilization of Allies and the United States is attained (one year plus) do the Allied forces appear to exist in comparable numbers with Soviet forces.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize the desirability of providing viable alternatives to general war in the event the measures enumerated in Annex C to Appendix A fail to deter the Soviets from denying Allied access to Berlin and limited ground force action is unsuccessful. In this connection, consideration must be given to other measures that will forcibly demonstrate on a rising scale US determination to achieve its objective of restoring access to Berlin. Possible measures could include consideration of actions such as the use of nuclear weapons on purely military targets in a manner which will forcibly drive home to the Soviets the seriousness with which the United States views the situation.


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6. It is recommended that you note the enclosed studies and forward them to the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs as requested by him, for use by Mr. Acheson in his continuing review of the Berlin problem.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

  
L. L. LEMNITZER  
Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

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## APPENDIX A

## MILITARY MEASURES WORLDWIDE

## THE PROBLEM

1. To determine preparations of mounting seriousness which could be taken by the United States in the CONUS, in Europe, and worldwide to provide a basis for the threat and use of military force to restore access to Berlin by application of:

- a. Substantial nonnuclear force in successive stages.
- b. General nuclear war.

## ASSUMPTIONS

2. Assumptions for this study include those set forth in paragraph 2 of the basic paper plus the following:

- a. The purpose of the preparatory steps envisaged in this study are twofold:

- (1) To influence Soviet decisions before they are taken this summer or fall

- (2) Provided the preparations envisaged in this study fail to have the desired deterrent effect, to create no later than October 1961 the best capability for application of substantial nonnuclear force to restore ground access against GDR forces alone, or against total Soviet Bloc capabilities which can be brought to bear in East Germany for periods of 5 to 15 days before resort is made to the use of nuclear weapons.

## FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

3. In a memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, dated 6 June 1961, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that the "Check-list of Military and Non-Military measures in the Berlin Crisis", forwarded to the Secretary of Defense on 12 August 1960,

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provides a wide range of actions responsive to the problem of  
 deterring the Soviet Bloc from attempts to blockade access to  
 Berlin. In addition, in their memorandum for the Secretary of  
 Defense dated 13 April 1961, as well as in their memorandum  
 for the Secretary of Defense dated 28 April 1961, the Joint  
 Chiefs of Staff reiterated that the "Checklist" together  
 with the premise on which it is based, i.e., accepting the  
 risk of general war, continues to be a satisfactory initial  
 framework for the development of plans for US and Free World  
 response to any Soviet attempt to take over Berlin or deny Free  
 World access thereto.

4. For additional facts see Annex A.

#### DISCUSSION

5. For discussion see Annex B.

#### CONCLUSIONS

6. It is concluded that:

a. The early execution by the United States of the  
 measures enumerated in Annex C to Appendix A, within the  
 time limits assumed in this study (i.e., 31 October 1961),  
 would be expected to influence the Soviet decision process  
 regarding Berlin. The military actions can be taken only  
 if the necessary political decisions required to implement  
 them have been made. Implicit in such political decisions  
 is the acceptance of the risk of general war.

b. The measures enumerated in Annex C to Appendix A  
 in most cases depend for full effectiveness upon complete  
 Allied cooperation, particularly by the nations with the  
 greatest interest in the Berlin question - the United  
 Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).  
 United States action alone is feasible only to the extent  
 that the Allies will permit the use of their national  
 territories and that the action contemplated does not

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involve the sovereignty of an Ally. The measures are  
designed to be a clear demonstration of US determination  
and leadership which could be expected not only to influence  
the Soviet decision making process, but also to restore the  
confidence of our Allies in the United States and to obtain  
their full cooperation and support.

c. Although a measure of Allied agreement could probably  
be obtained for the early execution of some of the measures  
envisaged in Annex C to Appendix A (e.g., increase state  
of readiness of US forces worldwide, but particularly in  
Europe), it is doubtful in the extreme that US Allies, in  
the absence of a clear-cut Soviet-inspired Berlin incident,  
would agree to a rapid and systematic build-up for limited  
nonnuclear war in Central Europe together with the risk of  
general war.

d. The execution of the measures envisaged in Annex C to  
Appendix A, is designed to produce a strong deterrent effect  
on the Soviets. There is a possibility, however, that the  
Soviets might react by taking military counteractions to  
pre-empt US and/or Allied efforts to protect West Berlin.  
For this reason the United States must be prepared for  
general war.

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## ANNEX A TO APPENDIX A

## FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

The fundamental difference in the concept envisaged in this study and the concept envisaged in the "Checklist of Military and Non-Military Measures in the Berlin Crisis" is as follows:

a. In this study selected measures would be implemented progressively over the next few months with a view to enhancing the credibility of the nuclear deterrent and improving US and Allied non-nuclear capabilities in Europe by 31 October 1961 in order to deter the Soviet Bloc from attempting a blockade of West Berlin and at the same time to prepare for the eventuality of general war.

b. The Concept of the "Checklist" envisages progressive application of measures after a Berlin incident has occurred while the measures listed in Annex C to Appendix A are designed to deter a Berlin crisis by adequate preparation beforehand..

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Annex A to  
Appendix A



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## ANNEX B TO APPENDIX A

## DISCUSSION

1. In accordance with the assumptions in this study, it is 1  
 envisaged that a number of actions, particularly military 2  
 measures, could be implemented immediately as a deterrent to 3  
 possible Soviet Bloc attempts to develop a Berlin crisis in 4  
 the near future. The concept of initiating some measures of 5  
 the type envisaged in Annex C to Appendix A to gain a deterrent 6  
 effect prior to an anticipated Berlin incident was recommended 7  
 by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their memorandum to the Secre- 8  
 tary of Defense, dated 13 April 1961, subject, "The Status of 9  
 Berlin Contingency Plans". 10

2. Although no immediate action was taken by the US Coordinat-11  
 ing Group to implement the above recommendation of the Joint 12  
 Chiefs of Staff, some of the measures recommended for early im- 13  
 plementation have, in effect, been executed. For example, 14  
 the existence of the Tripartite (United States, United Kingdom, 15  
 France) military planning staff (LIVEOAK) has become known as a 16  
 result of some recent newspaper articles. 17

3. As the Berlin situation has developed without a major 18  
 incident since Premier Khrushchev's threats in November 1958, 19  
 it has become increasingly clear that the Soviets remain as 20  
 intransigent even with regard to their objectives of making 21  
 permanent and irrevocable the division of Germany and the com- 22  
 plete incorporation of West Berlin into their East German 23  
 satellite. This Soviet position was most recently reaffirmed 24  
 at the recent meeting in Vienna between President Kennedy and 25  
 Premier Khrushchev. 26

4. Accordingly, this study focuses primarily on those mili- 27  
 tary reinforcement measures and preparations which could be 28

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recommended to the President for implementation in order both  
to restore the credibility of the US nuclear deterrent and to  
achieve as early as possible a military posture which would  
permit the United States and its Allies or the United States  
unilaterally, to apply substantial nonnuclear force against any  
Soviet Bloc attempt to blockade ground access to Berlin; and  
concurrently to prepare for the ultimate risk of general war  
which such actions involve.

5. The sequence of military actions which are envisaged is  
set forth in Annex C together with corresponding political  
actions and pertinent remarks with regard to implementation.

6. An inspection of the sequence of events in Annex C  
readily indicates that the actions envisaged amount to a  
"crash" program within the time limits assumed within this  
study (i.e., 31 October 1961). However, this aspect does not  
invalidate the over-all deterrent effect which may be expected  
from implementation of these measures.

7. While the execution of the measures envisaged in  
Annex C to Appendix A, whether on a US unilateral basis or  
Allied basis, is designed to produce a strong deterrent effect  
on the Soviets, conceivably it could have an adverse and  
opposite effect on the Soviet Bloc, i.e., instead of deterring  
them from a blockade of West Berlin, it could cause them to  
take military counteractions to pre-empt US and/or Allied  
efforts to protect West Berlin.

8. For example, if the United States and its Allies  
mobilize and deploy additional nonnuclear ground forces to  
Europe, as a minimum it may be expected that the Soviet Bloc  
will respond in kind. In addition, it may be expected that the  
Soviet Bloc will accuse the United States and the West of  
deliberately preparing for aggressive war in Central Europe  
for the purpose of destroying the German Democrat Republic (GDR)

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and reunifying Germany by force. In addition they are certain 1  
to raise the spectre of a resurgent and militant West Germany 2  
seeking to aggress against the Communist states under the pre- 3  
text of liberating East Germany and Berlin. Moreover, all of 4  
these moves are certain to cause serious repercussions in other 5  
parts of the world. For example, the fixation of United States 6  
and Allied attention on and the provision of additional resources 7  
to Western Europe could motivate the CHICOMs to attempt to 8  
achieve their objectives of liberating Taiwan and overrunning 9  
Southeast Asia by overt military force. 10

9. It is also obvious from an examination of Annex C that 11  
full Allied, including NATO, cooperation is not only desirable 12  
but essential if the full deterrent effectiveness of the 13  
measures envisaged is to be realized. In the absence of an 14  
overt Soviet-inspired Berlin incident, it is most improbable 15  
that the United States could count on full Allied cooperation 16  
in implementing a series of measures such as those envisaged 17  
in Annex C. Forceful US leadership, however, and US unilateral 18  
preparations to resort to force, if necessary, could have a 19  
catalytic effect on our allies in stimulating them to take 20  
appropriate corresponding actions. 21

10. That is not to say that United States Allies, including 22  
the FRG, would not fight for West Berlin. It is to say, 23  
however, that the people and governments of Western Europe 24  
may remain loath to engage in such deterrent preparatory 25  
actions without a clear demonstration of US leadership. 26

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## ANNEX C TO APPENDIX A

POSSIBLE MEASURES TO DETER A BERLIN CRISIS1. Purpose.

The purpose of this list of actions is to demonstrate a United States resolve to employ military force, to include the use of nuclear weapons if necessary, to prevent the Soviets from taking action to deny allied rights in Berlin.

2. Time Phasing.

The actions to be taken are keyed to Khrushchev's pronouncements to sign a separate treaty with the GDR by the end of 1961, and are phased into three time groupings: D-6 MOS to D-4 MOS; D-4 MOS to D-2 MOS; D-2 MOS to D-DAY (31 DEC 1961). Although this assumed time frame would not complete preparations by 31 October 1961, it would constitute as much progress as could be realistically expected in a 4-month period assuming an approximate 1 July 1961 starting date.

3. Implementation.

Although measures are listed in a generally ascending order of severity within the assumed time frame, the implementation of any measure listed is dependent upon the circumstances which may develop rapidly over the next few weeks. Accordingly, the measures could be executed in any order required.

4. Political Measures.

Opposite each military measure is listed corresponding political actions required for implementation. The political measures column is not intended to cover all corresponding appropriate political actions but only the most obvious ones required for military action. Of primary importance is the requirement for allied, particularly tripartite, agreement and cooperation for the full effectiveness of many measures.

5. Covert actions.

Although not listed herein, it is assumed that covert activities in support of all appropriate measures will be provided by the CIA and other government agencies concerned.



A. TIME PERIOD: D-6 to D-4 MONTHS  
(Assume D-Day is 31 December 1961)

MILITARY MEASURES

CORRESPONDING  
POLITICAL MEASURES

REMARKS

1. Restore Credibility of Deterrent

Restore credibility of the deterrent by:

a. Enhancing posture of nuclear capable forward forces by moving additional nuclear weapons forward in proximity to forces. (e.g., USCINCEUR land-battle missile warheads now dispersed in COMUS.)

a. Will require Presidential approval of increased nuclear weapon dispersal authority, and temporary augmentation at weapon storage capacity. Using available logistical transport and storage facilities, forward dispersal could be sustained indefinitely. Soviets could increase their nuclear dispersals to European satellites, but net advantage would retain option for timely withdrawal of weapon augmentation if necessary.

a. None

b. Instituting development program to produce a land-based MRBM for NATO.

b. DOD action required to initiate MRBM development program.

b. Can be sustained indefinitely. Counter to existing USSR program. Revocable at will.

c. Providing nuclear assistance to France.

c. Executive action to release nuclear information to France required.

c. Can be sustained indefinitely. Communist response in kind doubtful (i.e. China). Action irrevocable; information given cannot be withdrawn.

d. None.

d. Executive action to modify U.S. Policy is necessary.

d. None.



MILITARY MEASURES

2. Increase Readiness

Increase state of readiness of US forces world-wide, but particularly in Europe. This should include discontinuance of inactivation and/or retirement of operational forces such as B-47 wings and amphibious ships.

CORRESPONDING  
POLITICAL MEASURES

Urge our allies to do the same. For example, urge the UK to improve the state of readiness of British Army of The Rhine (BAOR) and RAF/Germany to include movement of combat service support units and strategic reserves from UK to continent.

REMARKS

Among appropriate measures would be the following:

- a. Step-up and practice alert and combat procedures.
- b. Deploy northern atomic task force wholly or partially to BAOR area.
- c. Implementation by unified and specified commanders on a periodic basis of selected alert measures contained in their respective alert plans.
- d. Intensified training of force, US or tripartite, selected to execute Berlin probe and ground access operation. Consider deployment of this force to the Helmsed area with replacement of this force with units from COMUS.
- e. Increase readiness to execute demolition and mining plans in Central Europe.

Annex C  
to Appendix A



MILITARY MEASURES

3. Reinforcement of US Forces  
Begin to bring US forces in Europe up to full strength and step-up pace of modernization.

CORRESPONDING  
POLITICAL MEASURES

Requires Congressional authorization for increase in size of Armed Services and provision of new weapons and equipment. In addition, this measure will necessitate an increase in the monthly draft call.

REMARKS

To bring current US forces in Europe to wartime strengths would require deployment of personnel from CONUS units. Replacement of such personnel within CONUS units would be necessary.

A necessary degree of industrial mobilization would be required to significantly increase rate of modernization within 1-month period.

4. Mobilization  
Initiate appropriate mobilization.

- a. Presidential declaration of a limited national emergency followed by supporting Congressional resolution of a full national emergency.

a. Appropriate mobilization will be required to enhance credible general war posture. Navy and Marine organized reserves, AF reserves and IG are generally considered ready for immediate integration into the active forces; most reserve Army units would require more time. More importantly, in the absence of a Presidential declaration of emergency, reserve and IG units could not be mobilized for a sufficient period to accomplish the objective. Forces would be generated in accordance with current mobilization plans.

- b. Alternative to declaration of national emergency is to seek new enabling measures from Congress.

- b. None

- c. Request NATO partners, particularly UK, France and FRG to take comparable action. Of particular importance is return of the French fleet to NATO control and return of French Army divisions to Europe.

- c. None



MILITARY MEASURES

CORRESPONDING  
POLITICAL MEASURES

REMARKS

5. Further Reinforcement of US Forces  
Deploy additional forces to Europe and  
other critical areas as required.

d. Extend draft law and increase draft calls. d. None.

Bilateral and MAC consultation should, if  
possible, precede movement to Europe of  
additional forces. Promulgation of  
Presidential declaration of National  
Emergency.

Without a Presidential declaration  
of a National Emergency the follow-  
ing units could be deployed to Europe  
within a thirty day period. Augmenta-  
tion by Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF)  
may be required.

- (1) 3 STRAC Divisions.
- (2) Air Force forces as required up to  
a maximum of 41 squadrons.
- (3) Fleet Marine Forces augmentation  
to Mediterranean (1 Div/Wing Team).
- (4) 2d Fleet to Eastern Atlantic;  
augment 6th Fleet by one ASW Group  
and one CVA.

6. Reinforcement of FRG  
Step-up arming of FRG army and air forces  
with nuclear capable weapons, and provide  
them with sufficient logistical assistance  
to insure their combat effectiveness.

Arrange for additional bilateral  
negotiations for the purpose of  
obtaining rapid agreement on these  
matters.

The provision of nuclear capable wea-  
pons to the FRG is a particularly sensitive  
point with Premier Khrushchev and the  
East Germans.



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MILITARY MEASURES

7. Air Actions

Air Force and Naval Air actions which can be taken to demonstrate US resolve and determination:

- a. Conduct air operations through corridors to Berlin at altitudes above 10,000 feet with fighter escort when appropriate.
- b. Establish continuous air surveillance and an ASW barrier patrol along the Greenland-Iceland-UK line.
- c. Augment SAC airborne alert as deemed necessary.

- d. Increase ELINT and photographic sorties around Sino-Soviet periphery.
- e. Resume U-2 flights.
- f. Increase reconnaissance flights in Berlin air corridors.
- g. Fly-over of Soviet Siberia and Arctic stations.
- h. On selective basis, destroy Soviet Bloc aircraft which attempt to interfere with our operations.

CORRESPONDING  
POLITICAL MEASURES

- a. Executive approval required to cease adherence to self-imposed restrictions upon use of corridor airspace.

- b. Will require some augmentation of US forces in the Atlantic, and UK support in providing coverage for UK-Faroes portion of the line.

- c. None.

- d. - h. Executive approval required depending upon action to be taken.

REMARKS

- a. Could provoke Soviet interception and possible attrition of aircraft. Equal possibility transit would be unchallenged.

- b. Enhance warning of hostile air, or submarine penetrations of this line.

- c. Enhance deterrence and provide strategic indication of US resolve.

- d. - h. Risk of attrition and possible capture of US personnel. Risk of Soviet propaganda gain in UN and world opinion. Soviets could respond in kind over Arctic and Europe. On balance, US will derive net advantage, with public opinion risks offset by increased respect for US determination and improved US intelligence. Effort can be sustained for protracted period or terminated at our option.

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b. Deployment to South Vietnam  
Should the situation deteriorate in spite of measures now being undertaken, deploy organized forces.

Obtain Dien's request.

None

8. Demonstration of Intent  
Conduct exercises, preferably tripartite but US alone if necessary, in the vicinity of Helmsedt readily identifiable as an action related to restoration of ground access.
9. World-Wide Actions
- a. Intervention in Laos  
Implement US or SEATO plans if necessary to regain control of LAOS.

Presidential decision required to restore control of Laos to Royal Laotian Government; to eliminate communist supported and augmented Pathet Lao/Kong Le units as a cohesive force and main obstacle to PLG control.

Seek full UK/French/FRG cooperation.

Will demonstrate Allied cohesiveness and resolve with respect to the use of force.

MILITARY MEASURES

CORRESPONDING  
POLITICAL MEASURES

REMARKS



MILITARY MEASURES

c. Measures against Cuba

(1) Undertake punitive measures against Castro regime in Cuba, to include naval and air harassment, cessation of all transportation to and from Cuba, reconnaissance over-flight, impounding all Cuban assets in US, jamming Cuban broadcasts, and encouraging intensification of internal resistance to Castro regime.

(2) Alternatively, take direct military action to overthrow the Castro regime.

CORRESPONDING  
POLITICAL MEASURES

Presidential decision required to weaken Castro regime by isolation from external assistance, and demonstrate US resolve to use forceful measures to overcome Communist penetration of Western Hemisphere. Solicit OAS cooperation.

Presidential decision for direct military intervention required.

REMARKS

c. Some Latin American adverse reaction likely, but it could be outweighed by respect for positive US indication of strength. Effective Cuban response infeasible. Could be sustained indefinitely, or cancelled immediately, at US option.

Annex C to Appendix A



B. TIME PERIOD: D-4 to D-2 Months  
(Assume D-Day is 31 December 1961)

REVIEW ALL THE FOREGOING FOR CONTINUATION, RETERRATION, OR,  
IF NOT ALREADY EXECUTED, FOR IMPLEMENTATION

### MILITARY MEASURES

#### 1. Resume Nuclear Tests.

### CORRESPONDING POLITICAL MEASURES

Initiate if Geneva talks have not produced acceptable results. Preannounce intentions justified on basis of refusal by Soviets to come to reasonable terms at the table.

None.

### REMARKS

Demonstrate to Soviet Bloc and world public opinion that US refuses to risk military disadvantage accruing from continued Soviet procrastination and intransigence in Geneva. Test for improvement of our nuclear capabilities relative to those of the USSR. Soviets could start tests as well.

Would indicate allied support of US position. Would enhance the air defense posture in Europe. Soviets could interfere with air operations in the air access corridors to Berlin.

3. Meeting of Military Commanders.  
SACEUR and SACIANT hold special meetings with subordinate commanders.

4. Commencement of Withdrawal of Personnel  
Begin withdrawal of non-essential personnel, including dependents from Europe and other forward areas.

5. Rotation Policy Suspended  
Suspend normal military rotation policy to and from Europe; stop dependent travel to Europe and other forward areas.

Notify Allies and explain reasons.  
Restrict tourist travel.

Notify Allies of planned policy.

To highlight the continuance of extraordinary activities of key military commanders.

Domestic public opinion will have to be conditioned to this step. Exact timing of commencement of evacuation of dependents will be determined in coordination with USCINCEUR.

Will increase force readiness by retaining experienced personnel in the area.



MILITARY MEASURES

1. Allied Reinforcement  
Request reinforcement and movement into position of British, French, and German military forces.

2. Completion of Withdrawal of Personnel  
Complete evacuation of dependents and hospital patients from forward areas in Europe.

3. Squadron Dispersal  
Execute USAF/NATO squadron dispersal plan.

4. Autobahn Traffic  
Organize all military autobahn traffic to and from Berlin in triplicate convoys escorted by armed MP's equipped with two-way communications equipment.

C. TIME PERIOD: D-2 Months to D-Day  
(Assume D-Day is 31 December 1961)

REVIEW ALL THE FOREGOING FOR CONTINUATION, RETERRATION, OR, IF NOT ALREADY EXECUTED, FOR IMPLEMENTATION

CORRESPONDING  
POLITICAL MEASURES

Allied support and agreement required.

State Department complete evacuation of non-essential US nationals.

Allied agreement required.

REMARKS

To increase NATO defense capabilities and demonstrate Allied willingness to use force to maintain access to Berlin.

Preposition forces in optimum position. Dispersal of force to improve survivability. Important signal of determination to Soviets. Move by organic equipment and theater airlift. Can remain deployed nominal time. Soviets would counter with similar deployment. Can be returned to normal readiness upon completion of requirement.

Convoy procedure can be maintained indefinitely, and discontinued with reduction in tensions. Soviet response in kind would not effect US operations.



MILITARY MEASURES

CORRESPONDING  
POLITICAL MEASURES

REMARKS

5. Naval Patrolling

Request active patrolling by Italian light forces in Straits of Otranto to maintain surveillance of Albanian ports, with particular attention to submarine activities.

Italian agreement required.

6. Submarine Exercise

Conduct submarine exercises with US & UK submarines and Turkish forces in Black Sea and along Turkish coast within terms of Montreux Convention.

British and Turkish agreement required.

7. ASW Surveillance

Execute ASW surveillance with visible patrolling at the Straits of Gibraltar and in the Turkish Straits.

Advise Allies.

8. Naval Countermeasures

Execute naval countermeasures against Soviet and GDR shipping as follows:

Ignore Soviet protests.

- a. Protracted delay of ship's servicing (bunkering, provisioning, etc.)
- b. Regulate the movement of Bloc ships in Allied ports.

To inform Soviets that their military posture and deployments are under surveillance. Would improve ASW activities of US forces in Mediterranean. Can be sustained for moderate duration and discontinued on US-Italian decision, or unilateral Italian decision, upon reduction of tensions.

To alert Soviets to US and UK naval strength in area in war fighting condition. In position to close Bosphorus if appropriate. Forces can be maintained in area indefinitely only if adequate back-up available. Redeployment can be effected by decision and on short notice.

Will give evidence of increasing US firmness of purpose.



<u>MILITARY MEASURES</u>		<u>CORRESPONDING POLITICAL MEASURES</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
c. Increase charges to Bloc shipping for bunkering, lightering, piloting and repairs in Allied ports.			
d. Refuse to charter shipping to Bloc countries.			
e. Intensify surveillance of Soviet fishing fleets in North Atlantic and North Pacific.			
f. Be prepared to close rapidly the naval exits from the Baltic and Black Seas.			
9. <u>Restrictions on Bloc Air</u> Prohibit Soviet Bloc air operations, including civil, over and into US and Allied territory.		Political decision to restrict Soviet and Satellite transportation and communications system will be required.	Sustainable to the degree that Allied support is obtainable. May be accomplished under various administrative and procedural guises. Soviet response would create problems. Revokable by degrees or instantaneously.
10. <u>Dispersal of CONUS Forces</u> Execute dispersal plan for CONUS based forces.			
11. <u>Navigational Precautions</u> Encode LORAN and CONSOL navigational aids.		Notify all user nations.	Denies international use of navigational aids.



MILITARY MEASURES

12. Airborne Alert

Direct SAC to execute airborne alert.

13. Offensive Operations

Conduct military operations in accordance with current plans as required.

CORRESPONDING  
POLITICAL MEASURES

None.

Be prepared to present an ultimatum to the Soviet Government in coordination with principal Allies.

REMARKS

Put general war strike force in optimum position for strike.

US and Allied plans are in being and under constant review and refinement. Several plans include precut messages of implementation requiring only decision to undertake the military action.

APPENDIX B

TYPES AND AMOUNT OF OFFENSIVE  
NONNUCLEAR FORCE FOR CERTAIN CONTINGENCIES (U)

THE PROBLEM

1. To determine the type and amount of offensive nonnuclear  
force which would have to be applied in Europe in order to:
  - a. Restore access to Berlin if the Soviets opposed it  
with German Democratic Republic (GDR) forces alone.
  - b. Permit progressive application of nonnuclear forces at  
successively higher levels as readily available USSR and GDR  
forces were encountered.
  - c. Allow the communists time and opportunity to change  
their decision to block access by avoiding destruction of  
the force without use of US nuclear weapons for a period of  
(1) five days, (2) 15 days, during which negotiations could  
be undertaken, looking to restoration of access.

ASSUMPTIONS

2. a. Assumptions for this consideration include those set  
forth in paragraph 2 of the basic paper.
  - b. That the preparatory measures as outlined in Appendix  
A have been taken.
  - c. That the operations envisaged for these situations  
are confined to the area of East Germany.
  - d. That any aggressive action conducted in Western Europe  
would invoke the NATO alliance and that the problem then  
becomes one of NATO at war with the Soviet Bloc and,  
therefore, outside the scope of this paper.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

3. See Annex A to Appendix A



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DISCUSSION

4. For discussion, see Annex hereto.

1

CONCLUSIONS

5. Under the assumption that the USSR does not employ nuclear weapons, the estimated forces required are:

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a. When opposed by GDR forces alone. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirm their view that the hypothesis of opposition from GDR forces alone is invalid, and that there is no substantive difference between GDR and Soviet military forces. However, using present active GDR forces as a unit of measurement (6 divisions and about 225 tactical aircraft), it is considered that a balanced force of seven divisions supported by four tactical air wings could reopen access to Berlin. This size force is based on the assumption that political limitations restrict military operations to the axis of the Helmstedt-Berlin autobahn and the air forces to defensive operations only.

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b. When opposed by readily available USSR and GDR forces in the area of East Germany only. Under such a situation the hostilities could not be limited to the Helmstedt-Berlin corridor alone. Operations would have to be conducted to meet and defeat Soviet and GDR forces throughout East Germany with the objective of establishing a defense line on the Oder-Neisse River line. Forces on the order of 50 allied divisions and a corresponding magnitude of air strength would be required to achieve this objective.

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c. To allow the communists time and opportunity to change 1  
their decision to block access. If the action begins with 2  
Allied forces opposed by GDR forces only, a balanced seven 3  
divisional force with adequate air support would provide, 4  
during the first five days, time and opportunity for the 5  
communists to change their decision to block access. In the 6  
event that the Soviets entered the operation at any time the 7  
situation described in paragraph 4 b (2) would pertain. The 8  
Allied force of seven divisions already committed to the 9  
operation could avoid destruction. 10

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## ANNEX TO APPENDIX B

## DISCUSSION

1. Proceeding on the hypothesis that preparatory measures have been taken, the US and Allied forces in Europe can be considered to be on a war-time basis and in a high state of readiness. As the United States Allied action to use military force to reopen ground access to Berlin threatens to overcome the German Democratic Republic (GDR) forces, the Soviets must decide either to permit the GDR forces to be defeated or to come to the aid of the GDR.

2. Assuming the Soviets come to the aid of the GDR, the operations could not be limited to a corridor along the Helmstedt-Berlin axis, but rather would be a major war in East Germany. The forces which the Soviets have readily available for employment in West Europe would require an Allied attack to defeat the Bloc forces in East Germany and to hold this area by occupying positions along the Oder-Neisse River line. Actually, in this operation, the objective of Berlin becomes secondary and the primary issue becomes the unification of Germany. To defeat the Bloc forces in this course of action would require on the order of 50 divisions together with the air forces and freedom of air action commensurate with the magnitude of the ground operations. The following assumptions prevail:

a. That an initial force of seven divisions have attacked along the Helmstedt-Berlin axis against GDR forces only and that at some point in the operation the Soviets entered the conflict in order to prevent the defeat of the GDR forces.

b. The attack of the Soviets is limited to the Allied forces operating in East Germany and that bases and forces in Western Europe are not attacked.

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(1) That the Soviets will reinforce their forces until 1  
approximately 60 divisions are employed in East Germany 2  
and Western Poland. 3



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## TAB TO ANNEX TO APPENDIX B

CONSIDERATION OF POSSIBLE SEQUENCE OF  
ACTION AND SOVIET REACTION

1. The preparations of mounting seriousness taken by the United States and Allies will have alerted the Communist Bloc and they will have intensified efforts to determine the number and disposition of additional US troop units in Europe.

2. Since the action taken to block access would most probably be taken subsequent to the signing of a peace treaty between USSR and the German Democratic Republic (GDR), the question of the location of Soviet divisions is important. It is possible, after the signing of the treaty for the Soviets, with much fanfare, to move its divisions out of the GDR. This is unlikely because the existence of the GDR regime appears dependent upon the presence of Soviet divisions, and also because it puts the Soviets in a less advantageous posture for combat in Western Europe. Therefore, it should be assumed that Soviet divisions presently in the GDR will remain generally in their present locations.

3. The study forwarded to the Secretary of Defense\* on 28 April 1961, gives the Joint Chiefs of Staff views of the possible sequence of US action and Soviet reaction. Although this concerned a two-division force probe, the sequence could remain substantially unchanged. It is assumed that the Soviets will sign a peace treaty with the GDR before the GDR adopt an intransigent attitude over access to Berlin. This appears to be the most likely course of action. However, access to Berlin may not be denied by the GDR for some time after a GDR-Soviet treaty and the United States must be prepared for such an eventuality.

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4. The sequence of actions and reactions are outlined below: 1
- a. The decision to enter nuclear war if necessary will have 2  
been made at the start of the action to reopen ground access. 3
  - b. Allied preparations. 4
  - c. Soviets sign a peace treaty with GDR and declare that 5  
GDR will control access into Berlin. 6
  - d. GDR representatives refuse entry at the Helmstedt check 7  
point, by physical force in the form of armed border police. 8
  - e. A small military probe has been tried and is forcibly 9  
blocked by what appears to be only GDR forces. 10
  - f. The United States commits a seven division force against 11  
the GDR forces. The GDR forces initially fight a delaying 12  
action, but subsequently as the US force advances, attempts 13  
to strike the rear and flanks of the US force. The US force 14  
has prepared against this and, therefore, its progress toward 15  
Berlin continues. 16
  - g. At this point it must be realized that the Soviets are 17  
furnishing at least logistic and technical assistance to the 18  
GDR. Some manned aircraft may be furnished, either from 19  
Soviet Air Force or from satellites. 20
  - h. Increased advance of the US Forces indicates to the 21  
Soviets that additional forces are necessary to reinforce the 22  
GDR. At this point Soviets may: 23
    - (1) Launch an assault on Western Europe with the 24  
divisions located with the GDR. 25
    - (2) Commit the Soviet divisions within GDR in support 26  
of GDR forces effort to halt and destroy the US Force 27  
advancing toward Berlin. 28
    - (3) Commit only a small portion of the Soviet divisions 29  
in the GDR, to strengthen defenses just enough to counter- 30  
balance the strength of the US Force. 31



- (4) Conduct nonnuclear air operations against US installations in Western Europe. This can be combined with any of the above courses of action, or can be conducted initially as the sole course of action.
- (5) Initiate submarine action against allied shipping and mining in allied waters.
5. The decision to initiate general nuclear war might be made under any of the following situations:
- a. When the Soviets cross the West German border with combat forces.
  - b. When the Soviets conduct air bombardment (even though nonnuclear) of US bases, airfields, and installations in West Germany.
  - c. When the Soviets enter the conflict in support of the GDR forces blocking access to Berlin.
  - d. If West Berlin is seized by East Germans or by Soviets in any action, including para-military, masked as a civil disturbance.
  - e. If the US Force proceeding along the Helmstedt-Berlin axis is in danger of annihilation because of heavy Soviet air-ground attack.

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## APPENDIX C

## ADEQUACY OF CAPABILITY

## THE PROBLEM

1. To determine the adequacy of our capability to prosecute 1  
 by 31 October 1961, the course of action described in Question 2  
 #2, assuming the preparations referred to in Question #1 have 3  
 been made. If the 31 October 1961 capability is judged inade- 4  
 quate for effective execution, how long would it take to create 5  
 the required capability? This adequacy to be considered from 6  
 the viewpoint of full Allied cooperations, including West 7  
 German participation, and also as a unilateral US action. 8

## FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. See Annex A to Appendix A. 9

## DISCUSSION

3. For discussion, see the Annex hereto. 10

## CONCLUSIONS

4. After a mobilization period of four months the US, or 11  
 the US and its European allies, has the capability of deploying 12  
 sufficient ground and air forces to Europe to restore access to 13  
 Berlin if opposed only by GDR. This same size force could 14  
 avoid destruction for a period of five days or 15 days if 15  
 opposed by GDR and Russian forces. 16

5. Due to the inability to determine the quality of European 17  
 Allied forces and due to the inability to predict with confidence 18  
 that all European Allies and the United States will commence 19  
 full mobilization four months prior to an anticipated incident 20  
 in Berlin, it is considered that there would not be sufficient 21  
 forces in Europe by 31 October 1961 to restore access to Berlin 22  
 against successively higher levels of GDR and Soviet resistance. 23

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6. Because of the need for air bases, staging areas, and assembly areas, it is impractical for the United States to consider unilateral action in the Berlin area. As a minimum, full cooperation of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) is required and to a lesser degree that of France and Great Britain is also required. In addition, the United States cannot put sufficient forces in Europe in a four month period to restore access against successively higher levels of GDR and Soviet resistance.

7. Considering the reinforcement rate of both sides and the need for industrial mobilization in order that the United States can support its Allies as well as its own forces, it would not be feasible for European Allies or the United States to engage in nonnuclear war with the Soviet Bloc forces which could be brought into the area by 31 October 1961. In some cases mobilization of the Allied countries requires 15 months and only after full mobilization of Allies and the United States is attained (one year plus) do the Allied forces appear to exist in comparable numbers with Soviet forces.

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DISCUSSION

1. Summary of Requirements. A summary of the forces required is included in Appendix B. Since Berlin is located in the central area and since the primary involvement of US forces will take place in the central area, a detailed study of requirements and adequacy of capabilities will be limited to this area. However, it must be most strongly emphasized that since the actions outlined in these studies could lead to general war it is most important that the north area and south area be reinforced. If this is not accomplished the central area can be outflanked and the entire NATO position in central Europe be placed in jeopardy. Summary of the requirements for Central Europe are:

a. To restore access if opposed only by the GDR. Seven Allied divisions and four tactical air wings would be required.

b. To permit progressive application of nonnuclear forces as successively higher levels of GDR and Soviet resistance were encountered. Forces on the order of magnitude of 50 Allied divisions and a corresponding magnitude of air strength would be required.

c. Navy. Since it is assumed that the actions contained in this study are taken prior to commencement of hostilities, it follows as a corollary that Army and Air Force units sealifted to Europe would be moved administratively under peacetime conditions. Under actual conditions, this assumption might not prove to be valid in view of Soviet capability to initiate submarine warfare at any time of their choice. Preparations must be made to insure the

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safety of seaborne movements against Soviet interference.' Navy mobilization should be concurrent with the other Services to bring ships to wartime complements and to provide the planned ASW augmentation in ships and aircraft from Ready Reserve.

2. Summary of Capabilities

a. Present forces in Europe are as follows:

<u>Country</u>	<u>Army Forces</u>	<u>Air Force Forces</u>
US	5 divisions	15 wings
UK	4 divisions (reduced strength)	15 wings
France	4 divisions	10 wings
FRG	12 divisions (reduced strength)	10 wings

The forces of UK, France and FRG have a capability for limited defensive operations and little or no offensive capability.

b. The current JSCP indicates that during the first four months of full mobilization after declaration of a national emergency by the President the US has the capability of moving 10 Divisions to Europe, including the three STRAC Divisions and one Marine Div/Wing Team which can be moved at any time but which normally would be moved during the first 30 days after mobilization.

c. The US Air Force would move 23 squadrons to Europe during the first 30 days after mobilization. This includes the CASF which can be moved at anytime. During this same period of time Allied contributions to the air force in Central Europe would amount to an estimated additional 6 wings.

d. It is estimated that by M+4 months our principal Allies in Western Europe could make the following additional forces available:

<u>Country</u>	<u>Army Forces</u>	<u>Air Force Forces</u>
UK	6 divisions	4 wings
France	2 divisions	2 wings
FRG	8 divisions	none



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e. Based on the above figures, the total US and Allied  
forces available by M+4 are estimated to be:

<u>Country</u>	<u>Army Forces</u>	<u>Air Force Forces</u>
US	13 divisions	22 wings
UK	10 divisions	19 wings
France	6 divisions	12 wings
FRG	20 divisions	10 wings
TOTAL	<u>49 divisions</u>	<u>63 wings</u>

f. The Navy indicates that the 10 MSTs transports now  
in operation in the Atlantic can move a total of 148,400  
troops during a four month period. Since it is assumed that  
this is an administrative move, not forceably opposed by  
the Russians, the movement of additional men and cargo is  
only contingent on the charter, requisition, and reactivation  
of additional bottoms to carry the required personnel and  
tonnage. The sealift capability can be increased to more  
than meet the total contemplated lift requirements. Air-  
lift would be available to handle priority movements and  
advance echelons.

3. Soviet Capabilities. The Russians presently have 20  
Divisions in East Germany. It is estimated that they have the  
capability of reinforcing their forces in East Germany at the  
rate of four Divisions per day for the first ten days and  
three Divisions per day for the remainder of the first month  
after D-Day for a total of about 128 Divisions. Additionally  
these Divisions would be supported by 1000 tactical aircraft  
positioned in East Germany and backed by another 2500 tactical  
type aircraft located in Western USSR alone.

4. In view of the foregoing, the following points are  
considered appropriate:

a. It is impossible for the US to carry out this operation  
without necessary Allied cooperation. In addition to pro-  
viding a united front to the Soviets with the attendant

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psychological advantages it is necessary to have the use of ports, airbases, staging areas, and assembly areas. As a minimum we must obtain approval by the Federal Republic of Germany and at least tacit agreement by the French and British. It is very apparent that it is to our advantage to obtain the cooperation and participation of as many of our NATO Allies as possible in this operation.

b. Another factor which would seriously affect the current capability of the Allied forces, particularly the US Forces, is that capability and concept are based on the use of tactical nuclear weapons rather than matching the Soviets man for man. If the use of these weapons is denied to our own forces, the conventional bomb and artillery support which could be made available for this operation would be far below levels that were employed and considered necessary in Europe during World War II.

c. The US Forces that have been mentioned in this study are earmarked in current mobilization plans for deployment to Europe. In addition to these forces the United States has both ground and air forces which are now earmarked for deployment to other areas. These additional forces could be sent to Europe; however, this would have an adverse effect on our world-wide general war posture.

d. The equipment and related material needed to initially outfit the additional mobilized forces required in this study must necessarily be drawn from war reserve stocks which are inadequate for a force of this size. Additionally logistical support of deployed forces of this magnitude engaged in an extended nonnuclear war would create further critical shortages in certain conventional weapons and ammunition. No reliance can be placed on the war production base for major items of combat equipment that are not in production on M-Day and in most categories in which

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critical shortages exist a period of from one to two years 1  
would be required to balance production and consumption 2  
requirements. 3

e. The divisions of the UK, France and FRG are practically 4  
all understrength, logistic support is marginal, and they 5  
should not be considered in terms of capability of US 6  
divisions. 7

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*check list*

BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING

The Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Berlin Contingency Planning met under the chairmanship of Mr. Kohler, Department of State, on 16 August 1960. The group gave consideration to a JCS-prepared checklist of possible military and non-military measures related to Berlin Contingency Planning which had been revised and submitted to you as a result of your memorandum of 10 June 1960 on the same subject. The primary purpose of this checklist is to provide the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group with a basis for recommending specific actions, establishing responsibility for their execution and presenting an approximate idea of the time required for execution.

The checklist was agreed to be of great assistance. However, the group decided that a further review must be made to isolate those measures which must be dealt with on a tripartite basis and those which are strictly for U.S. implementation. This will be done with a view to a paper being ready for tripartite consideration in approximately two weeks; it being intended to call a meeting of the Tripartite Coordinating Group at that time.

The Department of State agreed to inquire at this time whether the British and French had authorized their commanders to prepare the necessary unilateral supporting plans for restoring ground access to Berlin, in view of General Norstad's approval of CINCPAC's basic plan. It was considered that since the British and French were being asked at this time, they should be able to report the status of their plans at the next tripartite meeting.

The group recognized that two particular areas which would require further examination are non-military global countermeasures and measures to be taken in the event of possible Soviet or East German harassment of civilian access to Berlin.

The first of these areas, global countermeasures, will be reviewed by the Department of State, using already existing papers prepared on this subject. Again it is hoped that early British and French discussion of global countermeasures can be initiated. To date there has been little tripartite progress in this area.

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Civilian access problems were referred to Bonn for study after the Paris Summit (Tripartite Ambassadorial Meeting, 7 June). Bonn has done little and has pointed out the problem of conducting such an examination during the European holiday period. However, State has been informed that a study group began work at Bonn this week.

In summary, real progress has been achieved in Berlin Contingency Planning in the area of specific plans and actions related to military measures. However, a similar statement cannot be made in the equally important ancillary areas of civilian access and non-military countermeasures.

Prepared: European Region  
OASD (ISA)

8/24/60

Sec Def Rpt

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

1961 MAY 26 15 28

Refer to I-14453/61

MAY 26 1961

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS  
OFF SECY OF DEFENSE

B Mr. Gilpatric

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Temporary Reinforcement as a Berlin Deterrent (S)

At your 24 May meeting with Mr. Acheson, you suggested several military movements as suitable and timely steps toward forestalling a Berlin crisis. Ambassador Thompson's reports of his conversation with Khrushchev (Tab A) make the need for such measures even more pointed.

A directive to study but not prepare such movements is attached. Its execution would have important foreign policy and budgetary implications, among others. Because of the danger of possible leakage, however, the study has not been discussed beyond the Joint Staff, ISA, and Mr. Acheson.

In my judgment, these or similar measures would help materially to deter the USSR from provoking a Berlin crisis. Unless Khrushchev takes an unexpected conciliatory approach at the Vienna talks, I shall recommend that measures such as these be carried out.

Recommend you sign the attached directive to JCS and other interested OSD staff elements.

## 2 Attachments

1. Amb Thompson's reports  
(Cables 2887, 2888, 2889,  
dated 24 May 61) (Tab A)
2. Memo directive to JCS and  
OSD staff elements

cc: Mr. Gilpatric

Paul H. Nitze

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